Climate Change Litigation

Fifth Circuit Knocks Out Climate Change Liability Lawsuit Again

May 15, 2013 21:10
by J. Wylie Donald
Res judicata is one of those phrases learned in law school that seemed of limited utility. How often is someone going to bring the same claim twice?  Callow law students know little of the world.  The doctrine is frequently needed and, as was learned in law school, it can be used to dispose of a claim, even if the prior decision "may have been wrong or rested on a legal principle subsequently overruled in another case."  Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981). On Tuesday, the Fifth Circuit applied the hoary doctrine to snuff out (again) the seven-year old climate change liability saga of Comer v. Murphy Oil USA.  Comer was filed immediately following Hurricane Katrina and asserted that a long list of energy companies were responsible for the increased destructiveness of the hurricane because of their emissions of greenhouse gases.  The trial court disagreed and dismissed the case on standing and political question grounds.  On appeal, however, the plaintiffs convinced an appellate panel of the Fifth Circuit  to reverse the trial court.  Defendants asked for rehearing en banc, which was granted, resulting in the vacating of the panel decision pursuant to court rule.  Then things got weird.  After the grant of en banc review, the en banc quorum then dissolved with an eighth recusal among the active judges.  With no quorum, the case could not be reviewed.  Because the panel decision was vacated, the trial court dismissal was valid. Plaintiffs chose not to appeal to the Supreme Court.  Instead they sought mandamus, which was denied.  Plaintiffs then decided to file their claim again, not only by the same plaintiffs on the same theories, but against the same defendants.  The trial court had no difficulty dismissing their claims a second time, relying on res judicata, but also on the statute of limitations, the political question doctrine, preemption, proximate cause and standing.  Another appeal was filed; this time the panel did not side with the plaintiffs.  Instead, it ignored all of the bases for dismissal articulated by the trial court and settled on only one:  res judicata. To apply, four elements must exist: (1) the parties are identical or in privity; (2) the judgment in the prior action was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the prior action was concluded by a final judgment on the merits; and (4) the same claim or cause of action was involved in both actions. Opinion at 7.  Only the third element was disputed.  The court held that the trial court's first judgment was a final judgment because, although the panel reversed, that decision was vacated and thus had no effect on the trial court's decision.  Nor did the decision to grant rehearing en banc, nor the Supreme Court's denial of the mandamus motion.  And the trial court's decision was on the merits, notwithstanding that it was a jurisdictional (standing and political question) determination.  Opinion at 10.  Accordingly, res judicata applied; the dismissal was affirmed. We expect that the precedential value of the court's decision will be limited.  However, its non-precedential value is huge.  A broad and expansive theory of climate change liability was asserted by well-funded and capable plaintiffs' counsel.  After a long journey it joined on the ash heap claims asserted by the State of California (California ex rel. Lockyer v. General Motors), claims by various attorneys general and public interest groups (Connecticut v. American Electric Power), and claims asserted by a Native American community (Kivalina v. ExxonMobil) (albeit nursing a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court).  Petrochemical companies, automobile companies, coal companies and electric utilities are 4-0 on the climate change liability front, with no other cases out there.  The unanswered questions from Comer are the following:  Why didn't plaintiffs add new defendants?Why didn't plaintiffs assert state law nuisance claims in state court rather than pursue them in federal court?  Why didn't they appeal to the Supreme Court on the merits, rather than seek mandamus?  These questions are decisions on strategy, and we likely will never know. Last, however, and most importantly, where are the new theories of liability?  Bueller?  Bueller?  

Climate Change Litigation | Supreme Court | Utilities

Climate Change Legal Theories: The Atmospheric Public Trust Doctrine Moves Another Step Forward

April 29, 2013 05:49
by J. Wylie Donald
One of the shibboleths of those following climate change litigation is the idea that new legal theories will be surfaced, fired in the furnace of litigation and then forged as the vehicle for addressing climate change in the courts.  The public trust doctrine is being hammered out in that direction. Last month in Butler v. Brewer an appellate panel in Arizona considered a claim based on the theory that the atmosphere is subject to the public trust doctrine and that, therefore, the State of Arizona was obligated to take steps to address greehnouse gases and combat climate change.  Although the court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the suit, before reaching that conclusion it specifically rejected Arizona’s argument that greenhouse gas issues are non-justiciable under the doctrine. Butler is one of a slew of cases and regulatory petitions against the federal and state governments orchestrated by Our Children’s Trust, a public interest organization based in Oregon.  We have commented on OCT previously.  Its success has not been overwhelming, or even any.  Not one court has concluded that a state or the federal government can be compelled to do anything. Yet, if the measure of success is whether one’s theory is more well-formed than previously, and whether one can cite more legal precedent supporting it, then OCT is moving its ball forward.  By our count, OCT has positive rulings on its atmospheric trust theory from Texas, New Mexico and now Arizona. In Butler, the appellant raised only one issue:  "[w]hether the [public trust doctrine] in Arizona includes the atmosphere.”  The State of Arizona engaged that argument head on:  “the Doctrine does not include the atmosphere.”  Arizona also raised defenses of displacement, standing, and political question, among others.  The court considered prior Arizona and federal precedent to set forth the scope of the doctrine: First, that the substance of the Doctrine, including what resources are protected by it, is from the inherent nature of Arizona's status as a sovereign state. Second, that based on separation of powers, the legislature can enact laws which might affect the resources protected by the Doctrine, but is it up the to judiciary to determine whether those laws violate the Doctrine and if there is any remedy. Third, that the constitutional dimension of the Doctrine is based on separation of powers and specific constitutional provisions which would preclude the State from violating the Doctrine, such as the gift clause. From those principles the court had no difficulty responding to Arizona’s argument that the doctrine did not apply to the atmosphere:  “we reject the Defendants' argument that the determinations of what resources are included in the Doctrine and whether the State has violated the Doctrine are non-justiciable.”  Further, “While public trust jurisprudence in Arizona has developed in the context of the state's interest in land under its waters, we reject Defendants' argument that such jurisprudence limits the Doctrine to water-related issues.” (Note, however, Presiding Judge Gemmill concurred separately and stated:  "the atmosphere is not subject to the public trust doctrine.") Thus, “For purposes of our analysis, we assume without deciding that the atmosphere is a part of the public trust subject to the Doctrine.”  Unfortunately for the appellant, this was as far as the court was willing to go.  Appellant did not point to any violation of the Arizona Constitution or statutory law.  Such a violation was mandatory for the claim to succeed.  Additionally, in 2010 Arizona’s legislature took strong steps to ensure that the regulation of greenhouse gases remained in its bailiwick, rather than any administrative agency’s.  A.R.S. 49-191 provides: A. Notwithstanding any other law, a state agency established under this title or title 41 shall not adopt or enforce a state or regional program to regulate the emission of greenhouse gas for the purposes of addressing changes in atmospheric temperature without express legislative authorization. Absent a ruling that A.R.S. 49-191 was unconstitutional, there was no order the court could issue that would be able to implement the relief appellant sought.  Accordingly, appellant had no standing. Rome wasn’t built in a day.  The atmospheric public trust doctrine hasn’t been either.  But construction continues. 

Carbon Dioxide | Climate Change Litigation | Greenhouse Gases | Legislation

Native Village of Kivalina Files Its Petition for Certiorari - A Five-Year Climate Change Litigation Marathon That Has Yet to Start

March 15, 2013 05:54
by J. Wylie Donald
One day short of five years since the case was originally filed, on February 25, 2013 the plaintiffs in Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp. attempt once more to get out of the starting blocks, this time with a petition for certiorari  to the United States Supreme Court.  This follows dismissal by the Northern District of California in 2009, affirmance of the dismissal by the Ninth Circuit last September, and denial of a petition for rehearing en banc in November.   To be trite, it’s a marathon, not a sprint.  The response, if any, is due on April 3.  We can expect a decision on the petition a few weeks after that.  The substance of the petition was easily predicted.  The tension between Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981), and Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008), and mentioned by the concurrence (Judge Pro, sitting by designation on the Ninth Circuit) is the center of the argument.  Indeed it is the only issue behind the question presented:  “Whether the Clean Air Act, which provides no damages remedy to persons harmed by greenhouse gas emissions, displaces federal common-law claims for damages.” According to the petitioners, the starting point for the analysis is the Court’s 1981 decision in Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (“Milwaukee II”), where Illinois sought to enjoin Milwaukee’s federally permitted Clean Water Act discharges using the federal common law of nuisance.  Petition at 7.   In rejecting Illinois’s claim, the Court “focused carefully on whether the statutory scheme ‘spoke directly’ to the plaintiff’s ‘problem,’ and whether the statute gave the plaintiff a means ‘to protect its interests.’”  Id. at 8.  The same year, however, the Court also, according to petitioners, issued Middlesex, a decision sharply diverging from Milwaukee II. In Middlesex, fishermen aggrieved by ocean dumping were found to have no federal common law remedy because “’the federal common law of nuisance in the area of water pollution is entirely pre-empted by the more comprehensive scope’ of the [Clean Water Act].” Id. at 10. These two threads came together 27 years later in Exxon Shipping, where the Court “departed from any broad reading of Middlesex and returned to the more pragmatic and careful analysis of Milwaukee II.”  Id. Or maybe not.  Kivalina in candor also acknowledged: To be sure, it is possible to read Middlesex narrowly so as to reconcile the decision with Exxon Shipping.  Given Exxon Shipping’s statement that Middlesex is limited to situations where “plaintiffs’ common law nuisance claims amounted to arguments for effluent-discharge standards different from those provided by the CWA,” then it appears that a federal common law damages claim is displaced only where it is so inextricably intertwined with claims for injunctive relief that it amounts to second-guessing of the prospective statutory standards.  Id. at 11-12. Petitioners tied up their arguments with reference to American Electric Power v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011) (“AEP”), the case that established that greenhouse gas claims were displaced by the Clean Air Act.  AEP, it was asserted, “pointedly did not follow Middlesex in concluding that the whole 'federal common law of nuisance is entirely' displaced by a 'comprehensive' regulatory scheme, which would have made for a much shorter, and very different, AEP opinion.” Petition at 12.  Instead, the gravamen of AEP was that the displaced claims were those that would have interfered with EPA’s authority.  Id. at 13. In sum, “Milwaukee II, Middlesex, Exxon Shipping and AEP cannot all be correctly decided, yet all of them are viewed as good law – a conundrum that Judge Pro acknowledged in his opinion concurring in the result and that ultimately led him, and the other members of the panel, to a result in this case that is at odds with the fundamental rationale for displacement and with basic fairness.”  Id. Stated differently, Exxon Shipping permitted common-law damages even though the Clean Water Act displaced claims for injunctive relief.  This was to be contrasted with Middlesex, which “held that  a federal common-law damages claim was displaced by the Clean Water Act.”   Id. at i.  We expect that the Kivalina defendants will have a different point of view. The second part of the petition is the analysis of why the case is so important that the Court should hear it.  Kivalina gave four reasons: 1.  Climate change is an extremely important subject.  In a pointed salvo, petitioners cited to the petition for certiorari in AEP, where some of the same defendants stated “’The questions presented by this case are recurring and of exceptional importance to the Nation.’”2. Displacement presents a fundamental question of boundaries between the legislative and judicial branches.3. GHG emissions claims are “inherently important because of the extraordinary nature of global warming.”  4. Kivalina’s very existence is at stake. Notwithstanding all that, the odds of the petition being granted are long.  The Court only accepts between 100-150 of the more than 7,000 cases it is asked to review each year.  That is less than a 2% chance, all things being equal.   Greenhouse gas emissions were on the Court’s docket in 2007 (Massachusetts v. EPA) and again in 2011 (AEP v. Connecticut).  While we agree that climate change cases are important; we are skeptical that this narrow issue (displacement of damages, when the Court has already ruled on displacement of injunctive relief) justifies a place at the finish line, marathon or no.

Climate Change Litigation | Greenhouse Gases | Sustainability

Top 6 at 12: Highlights of the Top Climate Change Stories in the Second Half of 2012

December 31, 2012 08:59
by J. Wylie Donald
2012 has drawn to a close.  We chronicle here six of the most significant stories on the climate change front in the last six months.  For those looking for hope that government is taking action to rein in greenhouse gas emissions, the focus is on California, where cap-and-trade stepped into reality with California's first emissions auction.  Nationally and internationally regulation is at a standstill or going backward.  In the courts, the climate change liability plaintiffs were pounded again as the Ninth Circuit confirmed the dismissal of Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp.  Responding to climate change, however, is a different story.  Superstorm Sandy was a wakeup call on adaptation and the impacts of extreme weather; the National Flood Insurance Program managed to obtain statutory authority to include climate change in its considerations. 1.  Superstorm Sandy –  Climatologists are confident that the changing climate will lead to more frequent and more severe storms.  Sandy, following Hurricane Irene the previous year, delivered on both predictions.   A nine-foot storm surge at Battery Park.  Transformers exploding and putting Manhattan into darkness.  The Hoboken PATH station  submerged.  $50 billion in damage.  Superstorm Sandy set records and was completely consistent with the concerns of proponents of climate change mitigation and adaptation.  Did it have anything to do with climate change or was it simply a chance confluence of events?  The weather pattern was unusual.  There was a hurricane (albeit fading), coupled with a nor’easter, intersecting with an arctic high pressure front, under a full moon.  Individually, those are independent of climate change.  But there was also a record lack of sea ice, which has a measured and observed effect on global atmospheric circulation, which could result in severe weather coming together more severely.  So quite possibly Sandy is a result of climate change.  More important than the academic debate, however, is the impact on adaptation.  Regardless of one’s views on climate change, Sandy demonstrated that a major metropolitan area is vulnerable to extreme weather.  Steps will be taken to flood-proof subways, bury electric lines, raise seawalls, improve evacuation plans  and emergency response,  etc.  All of these are part of the steps needed to adapt to climate change.   Whether it is acknowledged as linked to climate change or not (but see Bloomberg Business Week cover following Sandy:   “It’s Global Warming, Stupid!”), adaptation is going to happen.  2.  Presidential Election - Climate change was an important part of the campaign:  "The Obama-Biden cap-and-trade policy will require all pollution credits to be auctioned, and proceeds will go to investments in a clean energy future, habitat protections, and rebates and other transition relief for families."  The 2008 election campaign that is. It was a completely different position in 2012. Or maybe not different at all.  No one could tell because nobody was talking about it.  Even Sandy wasn't enough to propel climate change into the debate in the last week of campaigning. 3.  Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil - The last filed of the original quartet (American Electric Power, General Motors, Comer, and Kivalina) of climate change nuisance cases, Kivalina finally made it to a federal appellate court, where in September it met the same fate as its brethren:  dismissal affirmed.  Plaintiffs asked for rehearing.  The Ninth Circuit wasn't interested.  As of this writing, the only case left is Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, which is on appeal following its dismissal last March (for the second time) by the Southern District of Mississippi.  According to that court, plaintiffs lose for a wide variety of reasons:  standing, political question doctrine, res judicata, collateral estoppel, displacement, statute of limitations and proximate cause.    4.  Cap-and-trade - California, alone among the fifty states, instituted its multi-industry full-fledged cap-and-trade program auctions in November.  All of its allowances for 2013 were sold at a price slightly above the mandated floor price of $10/ton.  Regulators and environmental groups hailed the auction as a success; some business groups were less enthusiastic.  The California Chamber of Commerce sued the California Air Resources Board to invalidate the auctions.  Meanwhile, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative in the northeast continues with its allowances trading at the floor price, and with less than 2/3 of its allowances selling in its August and December auctions.  Some commentary concludes that it is time for RGGI to shut down as its CO2 emission goals have been met.    From where we sit, RGGI's success or failure can't be judged until its carbon trading is done in connection with  a robust economy.  The world economic malaise suppresses business, and with it, carbon dioxide emissions.  California may face the same issue.   5.  National Flood Insurance Program Reform - Could a poisonously partisan Congress vote for this:  (1) IN GENERAL- The Council shall consult with scientists and technical experts, other Federal agencies, States, and local communities to--(A) develop recommendations on how to--(i) ensure that flood insurance rate maps incorporate the best available climate science to assess flood risks; and (ii) ensure that the Federal Emergency Management Agency uses the best available methodology to consider the impact of--(I) the rise in the sea level; ..."?   Not the Congress we know.  Or so we thought.  Somehow, somewhere, someone put this into a draft, which made it into and out of a committee, ended up on the floor of both houses, survived two votes and came out as an enrolled bill for the president's signature.  The president signed it into law in July.  This was part of the miscellaneous section of the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act  (aka the Transportation and Student Loan Bill), which may explain how this occurred.  In any event, climate change considerations are statutorily mandated as part of the NFIP.  42 USC § 4101a(d)(1).  We can expect a report by July 6, 2013.  Id. § 4101a(d)(1)(B).  Who'd have thunk?  6.  Global GHG Regulation - COP-18, the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, wrapped up in Doha, Qatar in the middle of December widely panned as ineffective.   While it extended to 2020 the Kyoto Protocol addressing global greenhouse gas emissions, major nations (Canada, Russia, Japan and New Zealand) dropped out, and the United States continued to refuse to participate.  Thus, only about fifteen percent of global emissions are now covered by the protocol (the EU and other European nations, as well as Australia, continue to support the protocol).   Developing nations (whose emissions are not restricted by Kyoto) had hoped to obtain commitments for funding "climate finance" of $100 billion, but that did not occur either.  One can see parallels between the Kyoto Protocol and the Western Climate Initiative and RGGI.  In all three members have dropped out and the commitment to address greenhouse gas emissions waivers.    The fiscal cliff was the focus at the end of 2012; climate change got short shrift.  2013 may establish that that was short-sighted.

Carbon Emissions | Climate Change | Climate Change Litigation | Flood Insurance | Rising Sea Levels | Weather | Year in Review

No En Banc Appeal in Kivalina; So What's Next for Climate Change LItigation?

December 8, 2012 19:18
by J. Wylie Donald
When we discuss climate change litigation with colleagues or acquaintances unfamiliar with it, they are always a little incredulous.  “The plaintiffs allege what?  How could you prove that?  There's no way they can win.”  Courts, however, cannot rule from their impressions; instead, they must parse arguments and facts and explicate the legal reasoning that supports shutting climate change cases out of the courtroom.  We have addressed in this blog many of those decisions as the climate change cases have wound their way up the appellate ladder.  That statement-of-reasons rule, however, does not apply when a court is being asked to grant rehearing en banc.  Then a judge can just say, “I’m not interested.”  And the case is done. That happened at the end of November in Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp. when the Ninth Circuit issued its denial (see attached) of plaintiffs' petition for rehearing:  “The full court has been advised of the petition for rehearing en banc, and no judge of the court has requested a vote on the petition for rehearing en banc.  Appellants’ petition for rehearing en banc is DENIED.”  Unless the plaintiffs file a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, and the Court accepts it (which we think unlikely with no circuit court split and the dismissal being a fairly simple extension of the Court's decision in American Electric Power), Kivalina is done.  That means that there is no federal common law of nuisance relevant to greenhouse gas emissions whether a plaintiff seeks injunctive relief or damages.  The federal Clean Air Act displaces the claim in both instances.  Two slim reeds remain for plaintiffs in the first wave of climate change litigation.  First, they need to prevail on an appeal before the Fifth Circuit in Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., which will require overcoming over half a dozen independent bases for dismissal found by the trial court.  Or second, they must succeed on a state-law-based theory of nuisance.  As we have noted recently, the Clean Air Act is likely to be found to preempt such claims.  In light of the string of defeats in American Electric Power, Comer and Kivalina for plaintiffs, we went looking to see where the climate change plaintiffs' lawyers were going next.  The websites of the lead Comer and Kivalina lawyers, Gerald Maples and Matt Pawa, were not helpful.  However, journalist Andrew Longstreth didn’t rest on the websites; he reached out directly to Messrs. Pawa and Maples. Here is the future he found:  "Pawa said that he and his co-counsel in the Kivalina case are discussing their options, which include asking the Supreme Court to hear an appeal or filing a new case in state court that asserts state common law claims. Pawa likened the current state of climate change litigation to the early stages of suits against cigarette makers and companies with asbestos liability. Before plaintiffs' lawyers in those cases were able to win judgments and settlements, they were stymied by defense arguments. "We haven't exhausted our theories or our efforts," he said. As stated above, the Supreme Court and state law nuisance paths do not seem likely to succeed.  Mr. Maples suggested a different path: "Future success in climate change litigation, he said, may depend on whether state attorneys general get involved, as they did in the tobacco litigation of the 1990s. With home insurance premiums rising as a result of climate change, Maples said, the litigation could become attractive to state AGs, who like consumer protection cases.  'If you can't afford insurance, that's almost like not affording food,'" So, is climate change litigation going to take a new turn and become an issue about consumer protection and insurance rates?  After reviewiing the Fourth Amended Complaint in Comer, we suggested in 2011 that this theory was something that bore watching.  Here is the theory in action as alleged in Comer:  “[Defendants' greenhouse gas emissions] put Plaintiffs' property at greater risk of flood and storm damage, and dramatically increase Plaintiffs' insurance costs." (Fourth Amended Complaint ¶ 37.)   Thus, with the demise of federal common law claims, consumer protection law claims may be the next wave.  20121127 Order (denying rehearing en banc), Kivalina v. ExxonMobil.pdf (34.55 kb)

Carbon Emissions | Climate Change Litigation | Insurance

State Common Law Carbon Dioxide Liability Claims: Premonitions of Preemption (and Dismissal)

November 28, 2012 21:48
by J. Wylie Donald
Left open by the Supreme Court’s decision in American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527  (2011), was the question of whether state law nuisance claims for the emission of carbon dioxide were viable in the face of the Clean Air Act.  That question continued to be answered in the negative with the decision of the Western District of Pennsylvania last month in Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, GenOn Power Midwest, L.P. (W.D. Penn. Oct. 12, 2012) (attached), which was appealed to the Third Circuit the Friday before Thanksgiving.1    In Bell, plaintiffs, neighbors to defendant’s coal-fired electricity generating plant, filed suit alleging: that the [defendant’s] atmospheric emissions fall upon their properties and leave a film ofeither black dust (i.e., unburned coal particulate/unburned coal combustion byproduct) or whitepowder (i.e., fly ash). According to the Plaintiffs, those discharges require them to constantlyclean their properties, preclude them from full use and enjoyment of their land, and “make[them] prisoners in their own homes.”  Order at 2.  Plaintiffs further alleged that defendant did not use best available technology and was damaging the plaintiffs' properties, an outcome not permitted by defendant’s Permit to Operate.  Id. at 3.  As to legal theories, plaintiffs alleged nuisance, negligence and recklessness, trespass and strict liability.  Id. Defendant moved to dismiss, asserting, among other things, that the claims were preempted by the Clean Air Act.  Id. at 5.  The court agreed.  Plaintiffs had attempted to distance themselves from their complaint, which had criticized defendants for failing to comply with their Clean Air Act permit and sought injunctive relief.  They asserted in their papers that “[t]he Defendant is allowed to emit whatever millions of pounds of emissions the [EPA] has decided for Defendant but Defendant is not allowed by those emissions granted [to] it by the [EPA] to damage private property.”  Id. at 8. The court was not buying:  “A review of the Complaint reveals that the allegations of Plaintiffs, as pleaded, assert various permit violations and seek a judicial examination of matters governed by the regulating administrative bodies. … Thus, the Court reads the Plaintiffs’ Complaint, including its common law claims, as necessarily speaking to and attacking emission standards."  Id. at 10. The court specifically noted that the Supreme Court, in American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, had held that “the Clean Air Act preempted federal common law nuisance claims as a means to curb emissions from power plants.”  Id. at 12 (citing 131 S. Ct. at 2540).  It also noted, however, that the Court had not ruled on state law nuisance claims.  Those claims would depend “on the preemptive effect of the federal Act.” Id. (citing 131 S. Ct. at 2540). Did the Clean Air Act preempt state law nuisance claims?  The court had little doubt and turned for authority to the Fourth Circuit’s decision in N. Carolina, ex rel. Cooper v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 615 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2010), cert. dismissed, 132 S. Ct. 46(2011)).  In finding that “public nuisance claims were preempted because they threaten to scuttle the comprehensive regulatory and permitting regime that has developed over several decades,” Order at 12-13, the Fourth Circuit held:  A field of state law, here public nuisance law, would be preempted if a scheme of federal regulation is so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it. Here, of course, the role envisioned for the states has been made clear. Where Congress has chosen to grant states an extensive role in the Clean Air Act's regulatory regime through the SIP and permitting process, field and conflict preemption principles caution at a minimum against according states a wholly different role and allowing state nuisance law to contradict joint federal-state rules so meticulously drafted. Id. at 13, quoting Cooper. 615 F.3d at 303 (citations, quotation marks and alterations in original omitted). Accordingly, because the “specific controls, equipment, and processes to which the Cheswick Generating Station is subject to are implemented and enforced by [state and federal regulators]  Plaintiff’s Complaint, as pled, would necessarily require this Court [the Western District] to engraft or alter those standards, and judicial interference in this regulatory realm is neither warranted nor permitted. To conclude otherwise would require an impermissible determination regarding the reasonableness of an otherwise government regulated activity.”  Id. at 14.  Thus, plaintiffs’ claims were pre-empted. Plaintiffs had one slim hope.  The Clean Air Act contains a “savings clause”, which provides “[n]othing in this section shall restrict any right which any person (or class of persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of any emission standard or limitation or to seek any other relief (including relief against the Administrator or a State agency).” 42 U.S.C. § 7604(e).  This too had been considered in Cooper and rejected.  Order at 14, citing 15 F.3d at 303-04.  Further, the Supreme Court had spoken on savings clauses as well:  “As we have said, a federal statute’s saving clause cannot in reason be construed as allowing a common law right, the continued existence of which would be absolutely inconsistent with the provisions of the act.”  Id. at 14, quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011).  Thus, the court found that “Based on the extensive and comprehensive regulations promulgated by the administrative bodies which govern air emissions from electrical generation facilities, the Court finds and rules that to permit the common law claims would be inconsistent with the dictates of the Clean Air Act.”  Id. at 15.  Accordingly, notwithstanding the suggestion by the Supreme Court in American Electric Power that state law nuisance claims for carbon dioxide liability might be viable, if the Western District’s analysis is correct and applicable to carbon dioxide, such claims will not survive for very long.   1Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 2d 849, 865 (S.D. Miss. 2012), also relied on American Electric Power and found state law nuisance claims displaced by the Clean Air Act.  That court had first found that plaintiffs’ claims failed due to res judicata and estoppel, and half a dozen other reasons, and its analysis of the displacement and preemption issue is not extensive. See Dismissed Means Dismissed: Comer v. Murphy Oil, the First Climate Change Liability Damages Suit, Is Tossed Again. 20121012 Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, Order of Dismissal & Notice of Appeal.pdf (694.83 kb)

Carbon Dioxide | Climate Change Litigation | Supreme Court

Ninth Circuit Displaces Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Climate Change Liability Case

September 21, 2012 16:22
by J. Wylie Donald
In litigation concerning liability for the emission of greenhouse gases, the federal common law of nuisance is displaced by the Clean Air Act.  This is not news.  It was established by the Supreme Court over a year ago in American Electric Power v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011). This morning, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged the rule and applied it to the plaintiffs in Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp. ("Opinion") and affirmed the dismissal by the Northern District of California.  See Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009). In a nutshell, a native Alaskan village on the shores of the Chukchi Sea brought suit against electric utilities, oil companies and one coal company.  The complaint asserted the defendants are responsible for excess emissions of greenhouse gases, which have led to global warming, which has resulted in delayed formation of arctic sea ice and early melting of the ice, which has accelerated the erosion caused by winter storms.  The plaintiffs sought damages for the cost of relocating their village.  See Opinion 11648-49.  The Court of Appeals dutifully explained the federal common law of nuisance and the doctrine of displacement.  Plaintiffs had hoped to avoid the application of American Electric Power by arguing that it was a case about injunctive relief.  Kivalina was different:  the plaintiffs there sought damages.  The Court was unmoved.  It stated simply:  “under current Supreme Court jurisprudence, if a cause of action is displaced, displacement is extended to all remedies.”  Opinion at 11655.  It did not matter that EPA had not acted before the damage was incurred; "Congressional action, not executive action, is the touchstone of displacement analysis.”  Opinion at 11656.  Nor did it matter that the Court’s decision would be applied retroactively.  Id.  The concurrence (Judge Pro of the District of Nevada, sitting by designation) was not as unequivocal as the Court, and explicated a tension between the Supreme Court’s rulings in Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Ass’n., 453 U.S. 1, 4 (1981), and Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008).  Middlesex expressly stated that “where a federal common law nuisance claim for injunctive relief is displaced, a federal common law nuisance claim for damages claim likewise is displaced”, but, according to Judge Pro, Exxon’s “overall holding suggests that severing rights and remedies is appropriate as between damages and injunctive relief in some circumstances.” Opinion at 11663, 11665. In the end, however, Judge Pro agreed that the doctrine of displacement shuts the door on federal common law claims for nuisances allegedly caused by greenhouse gas emissions whatever remedy is sought. More interesting and of more moment we think are two points made by the concurrence; the first will give heart to greenhouse gas plaintiffs, while the second may empty their sails. Judge Pro acknowledged that the Supreme Court’s decision and the 9th Circuit’s decision did nothing to affect the plaintiffs’ state law nuisance claims.  He wrote: Once federal common law is displaced, state nuisance law becomes an available option to the extent it is not preempted by federal law. AEP, 131 S. Ct. at 2540 (“In light of our holding that the Clean Air Act displaces federal common law, the availability vel non of a state lawsuit depends, inter alia, on the preemptive effect of the federal Act.”). The district court below dismissed Kivalina’s state law nuisance claim without prejudice to refiling it in state court, and Kivalina may pursue whatever remedies it may have under state law to the extent their claims are not preempted.  Opinion at 11671. We predicted this next phase when the case was argued back in November of last year.  Accordingly, the Kivalina case is not dead yet. However, judicial skepticism of climate change plaintiffs’ current liability theories is expanding.  Judge Guirola, in Comer v. Murphy Oil USA Inc in the Southern District of Mississippi, was dubious of the causation story:  “the tenuous nature of the causation alleged is readily apparent at the pleadings stage.”  Judge Pro went one further: Kivalina has not met the burden of alleging facts showing Kivalina plausibly can trace their injuries to Appellees. By Kivalina’s own factual allegations, global warming has been occurring for hundreds of years and is the result of a vast multitude of emitters worldwide whose emissions mix quickly, stay in the atmosphere for centuries, and, as a result, are undifferentiated in the global atmosphere. Further, Kivalina’s allegations of their injury and traceability to Appellees’ activities is not bounded in time. Kivalina does not identify when their injury occurred nor tie it to Appellees’ activities within this vast time frame. Kivalina nevertheless seeks to hold these particular Appellees, out of all the greenhouse gas emitters who ever have emitted greenhouse gases over hundreds of years, liable for their injuries.  Opinion at 11675.  To be sure, the Supreme Court approved an action by various States to challenge EPA’s failure to regulate greenhouse gases.  See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).  But “[i]t is quite another [thing] to hold that a private party has standing to pick and choose amongst all the greenhouse gas emitters throughout history to hold liable for millions of dollars in damages.”  Opinion at 11676. Judge Pro would have dismissed the case on standing grounds as well. Finally, notwithstanding our foresight above, it is rarely worth getting out the crystal ball to predict the outcome of a case or cases.  If we could do that with any reliability, we wouldn’t be sitting at this keyboard.  So rather than a prediction, we think offering some context is appropriate.  Will states be receptive to climate change liability suits as currently cast?  We are skeptical.  The environmental organization, Our Children’s Trust, orchestrated over a dozen lawsuits seeking to force state regulators to address greenhouse gas emissions.  With only one exception (New Mexico), those cases have been dismissed in jurisdiction after jurisdiction (Alaska, Arizona, Colorado. Minnesota, Montana, Oregon, Texas, Washington and the District of Columbia).  And even in the case that is moving forward, all the court permitted was an action to pursue whatever recourse was in place under current law, which is no more than the Supreme Court ruled in Massachusetts v. EPA. 

Carbon Dioxide | Climate Change Litigation

Is a Mass Filing the Right Strategy to Get Carbon Dioxide Regulation Going?

August 3, 2012 20:53
by J. Wylie Donald
After a string of defeats at the regulatory agencies and state and federal courts, Our Children's Trust finally notched two victories last month in its quest to use the public trust doctrine to implement carbon dioxide emission regulations.  Our Children's Trust, an environmental organization based in Oregon,  began its campaign in May 2011 when it oversaw the filing of nearly two score regulatory petitions and a dozen lawsuits seeking to force individual states to take action to restrict carbon dioxide emissions.   OCT's trademark feature is to include as plaintiffs "youth activists".  Up to the beginning of July it had not had any success.  But then, maybe, the tide began to turn.  First, on July 9 Texas District Court Judge Gisela Triana partially overrode the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality's decision rejecting a petition for rulemaking on the public trust doctrine.  Petitioners appealed the decision in Bonser-Lain v. TCEQ.  Petitioners had sought, relying on the public trust doctrine, to force the TCEQ to act to preserve the atmosphere by regulating carbon dioxide.  The TCEQ had concluded that in Texas the public trust doctrine applies solely to water.  Furthermore, according to the Commission, it was precluded from acting by the federal Clean Air Act, which preempted more restrictive state action.  Judge Triana made short shrift of both arguments.  Relying on Article XVI of the Texas Constitution she ruled:  "The Court will find that the Commission’s conclusion, that the public trust doctrine is exclusively limited to the conservation of water, is legally invalid. The doctrine includes all natural resources of the State.”  As to the preemption idea, the federal Clean Air Act "is a floor, not a ceiling, for the protection of air quality, and therefore the Commission's ruling on this point is not supported by law."  The court did find, however, that because of other pending litigation, the TCEQ did properly exercise its discretion in refusing to entertain the petition.  Second, on July 14, New Mexico District Court Judge Sarah Singleton refused to dismiss  a case asserting the State of New Mexico had an obligation to protect the atmosphere under the public trust doctrine.  The 18-line decision would hardly merit discussion except that this was the first decision allowing one of these cases to move forward.  Like the petitioners in Texas, the plaintiffs in New Mexico sought  to establish the public trust doctrine as a vehicle to control carbon dioxide emissions.  In a nutshell, Judge Singleton ruled that the suit, Sanders-Reed v. Martinez, could go forward insofar as it alleged that the State of New Mexico was not in compliance with laws passed by the New Mexico Legislature.  Specifically, the "Motion [to Dimiss] is DENIED to the extent that Plaintiffs have made a substantive allegation that, notwithstanding statutes enacted by the New Mexico Legislature which enable the state to set state air quality standards, the process has gone astray and the state is ignoring the atmosphere with respect to greenhouse gas emissions."  The motion was successful, however, where the court dismissed claims "based on the New Mexico Legislature's failure to act with respect to the atmosphere."  These cases may or may not be important in the climate change arena.  To be sure, they upset an unbroken stream of victories for state regulators over OCT plaintiffs and will undoubtedly serve as a rallying point for the remaining cases as well as to-be-filed cases.  But the comments in  Bonser-Lain are only dicta and that Sanders-Reed survived a motion to dismiss says nothing about the merits.  But the mass-filing strategy by Our Children's Trust bears watching because it is not unique and may surface elsewhere.  Indeed it has. Following the filing of a class action against Thomas Jefferson Law School in California over alleged misrepresentations in law school placement data, a team of lawyers coordinated by two attorneys in New York, David Anziska and Jesse Strauss, put together a mass-filing strategy similar in some respects to that followed by OCT.  Twelve apparently is the magic number.  The law school placement team brought suit against a dozen law schools in jurisdictions across the nation.  Although another twenty suits are theoretically teed up as information from prospective plaintiffs is collected, those suits were promised for Memorial Day but have not yet materialized.  A big filing day is mandatory to maximize press coverage.   As were the atmospheric trust cases, the law school placement cases were nearly all filed on the same day.  Both litigation teams have sought public exposure throughout the course of the litigation. A defendant's typical response in both sets of cases is a motion to dismiss.  Some throw in everything and the kitchen sink, others are more thoughtful.  There is a danger to the kitchen sink approach; the court may issue a ruling giving the plaintiffs a set of victories as happened with Thomas Cooley Law School in Michigan (see attached) (even though Cooley ultimately prevailed at the trial court). But this is where the mass filing paradigm falls down.  Both sets of litigation are based on state law.  In the law school placement cases, two California cases have survived demurrers because California consumer protection law includes educational services (see attached), and two have been dismissed because, among other things, Michigan consumer protection law does not reach professional schools and New York law finds law students to be sophisticated consumers.  In the atmospheric public trust cases, notwithstanding case after case rejecting the claims, courts in New Mexico and Texas find under their states' laws that the theory is well-founded.  The lesson one should take from this is that, like politics, all law is local.  Well-timed press releases and news conferences touting the ineluctable triumph of the plaintiffs, at the end of the day count for very little.  Rather, what matters is the particular law of the particular jurisdiction on the particular facts of the case.  Both plaintiffs and defendants should take note. 20120726 Filing in Florida Coastal of USF and Golden Gate decisions.pdf (366.85 kb) 20120607 Initial Thomas Cooley Law School Order re Motion to Dismissf.pdf (67.07 kb)

Carbon Dioxide | Climate Change Litigation | Legislation | Regulation

The Top 6 at 6: A Review of the Most Important Climate Change Legal Stories in the First Half of 2012

June 30, 2012 21:01
by J. Wylie Donald
Arbitrary and capricious.  Familiar words to anyone involved in regulatory activity.  But also applicable to calendars, which willy-nilly cut off a series of events and ascribe them to one solar cycle, as if the sun gave two hoots.  As we perused the various "Climate Change: Year in Review" reviews that crossed our desk last January, we concluded 365 days are arbitrary and one year capricious in assessing what is important to resurrect and re-discuss.  We further concluded that a 12-month look-back is too long.  So, for what it is worth, here is one of six months. 1.  Cap-and-Trade in the U.S. - On January 1 the Western Climate Initiative (WCI) (or what remains of it) initiated its long-anticipated cap-and-trade program for greenhouse gas emissions.  Notwithstanding the lack of support from other WCI members, California and Quebec are moving forward with a cap-and-trade program.  California's and Quebec's mandated reporting rules applied to stationary sources emitting at or above 25,000 metric tons of CO2e per year.  On May 9 coordination between the two programs was announced  initiating the 45-day public comment period.  The first auction will be held in November and then, on January 1, 2013, enforcement begins when covered entities must participate. It is obviously too soon to tell how successful the California program will be, but when the world's eighth largest economy takes an initiative, it is likely to have impact elsewhere, particularly when it is the only program in the nation. 2.  Greenhouse Gas Liabilities and Insurance Coverage - We didn't think there would be anything to say this year about coverage for GHG liabilities.  After all, in the only case in litigation the Virginia Supreme Court issued its opinion in AES Corp. v. Steadfast Insurance Co. in September 2011 and concluded that there was no "occurrence" triggering coverage made in the allegations pleaded by the Native Village of Kivalina against AES Corporation.  But then the Court granted a motion for reconsideration in January and many puzzled as to what was going on.  Apparently nothing as the Court reiterated its previous conclusions in an April 20, 2012 opinion.  The decision will be significant in Virginia because it may have upset coverage in more conventional cases, as the concurring opinion of Justice Mims suggests.  As for the rest of the nation, it is one decision, on one issue, on one set of facts.  The case is important because it is the first, but we will be surprised if it provides guidance anywhere else. As for greenhouse gas liability that is a story unto itself.  Like something out of a Steven King novel, the Comer v. Murphy Oil case refuses to pass quietly into the night.  This is the case that was dismissed by the Southern District of Mississippi, reversed by the 5th Circuit, vacated by the 5th Circuit en banc when it accepted rehearing and then reinstated as dismissed when the 5th Circuit's quorum dissolved.  Following a denial of a request for a writ of mandamus from the U.S. Supreme Court, the Comer plaintiffs re-filed their complaint against over 100 electric utilities, oil companies, chemical companies and coal companies alleging their GHG emissions were responsible for the ferocity of Hurricane Katrina.  And the Southern District of Mississippi dismissed the plaintiffs again on March 20.  And plaintiffs appealed again.  We don't expect the case to be finally at rest until the Supreme Court denies certiorari, or accepts it (perhaps in order to address the Ninth Circuit's much-anticipated decision in Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil, which has been pending for over six months since oral argument). 3.  Natural Gas:  The Bridge Fuel - With the combining of two technologies, hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling, a resource of unprecedented volume is "changing the game" of energy.  "Annual shale gas production in the US increased almost fivefold, from 1.0 to 4.8 trillion cubic feet between 2006 and 2010. The percentage of contribution to the total natural gas supply grew to 23% in 2010; it is expected to increase to 46% by 2035."  Thus reported the Energy Institute at the University of Texas in February in a 400+ page tome entitled Fact-Based Regulation for Environmental Protection in Shale Gas Development.  Momentously, the UT researchers report "there is at present little or no evidence of groundwater contamination from hydraulic fracturing of shales at normal depths."  The reference to "normal depths" acknowledged that in December 2011 the EPA linked contamination in Pavilion, Wyoming to shallow fracking operations. In March 2012, however, EPA agreed to conduct further testing.  And then in May, a personal injury tort case, Strudley v. Antero Resources Corp. et al., No. 2011-CV-2218 (2d Jud. Dist. Ct. Col. May 9, 2012), brought against fracking operators in Colorado was thrown out because plaintiffs could not muster adequate proofs of specific causation. Despite some intense opposition, fracking is moving forward.  What does all of this have to do with climate change?  Natural gas when burned emits half the carbon dioxide of coal.  Accordingly, some argue that natural gas is the bridge to a low-carbon future.  If so, then fracking builds that bridge. 4.  Innovative Climate Change Legal Theories - Last spring the sound and the fury were intense as the environmental organization Our Children's Trust unleashed several dozen regulatory petitions and a dozen lawsuits across the nation.  The goal:  establish the public trust doctrine as applicable to the atmosphere and use it to implement greenhouse gas regulation.  It appears that all of that is signifying nothing. Over two dozen petitions were denied in 2011 and two lawsuits were dismissed (Montana and Colorado).  It did not get any better in 2012.  The first six months of this year delivered only bad news to OCT.  State courts dismissed lawsuits in Alaska, Arizona, Minnesota, Oregon, and Washington.  The federal court in the District of Columbia did the same.   Plaintiffs took a voluntary dismissal in California.  To be sure, OCT has filed appeals (the one in Minnesota is scheduled to be argued on July 18).  Having failed to convince a single court so far, we think we are safe in predicting an uphill battle. 5.  Power Plant Performance Standards - On April 13, 2012, a scant seven months before the presidential election, the EPA published in the Federal Register standards of performance for all new fossil fuel-fired electricity-generating units requiring them to meet an electricity-output-based emission rate of 1,000 lb of carbon dioxide for every megawatt-hour of electricity generated.  The only plants that can meet this standard without implementing costly carbon capture and storage technology are natural gas plants.  Thus, the administration took a strong stand against coal-based generation.  Or it is all smoke and mirrors.  As EPA notes in the proposed rule, because of the glut of natural gas made available by fracking, there is little likelihood of a new coal-powered plant before 2030.  Notwithstanding, industry groups have filed a half-dozen lawsuits seeking to derail the rule. 6.  EPA's Greenhouse Gas Regulatory Program - Less than a week ago USEPA and its GHG program got a firm "thumbs up" from the D.C. Circuit.  Inundated with over two dozen appeals of various USEPA GHG regulations, the Endangerment Finding, the Tailpipe Rule, the Tailoring Rule and the Timing Rule (for citations see The DC Circuit Locks in USEPAs GHG Regulations Sort Of). The court turned away every challenge, sometimes on the merits and sometimes on procedural grounds such as standing.  There is much that deserves comment not the least of which are the differences between the states with California, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington, lining up on one side, and Alabama, Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, and Virginia lining up on the other.  To focus more on legal matters, several challenges were turned away on standing.  For example, neither states nor industry groups could challenge the Tailoring Rule as they did not allege the requisite injury.  Because the Tailoring Rule benefits small businesses (who are not required to comply with certain GHG emission requirements), it would appear that the door may remain open for parties who allege competitive injury (i.e., non-regulated entities gain a competitive advantage). In the meantime, do not expect Congress this election year to touch the issue.    

Carbon Dioxide | Climate Change | Climate Change Litigation | Greenhouse Gases | Insurance | Legislation | Regulation | Year in Review

The DC Circuit Locks in USEPA's GHG Regulations - Sort Of

June 26, 2012 20:13
by J. Wylie Donald
It took a little over five years but USEPA's greenhouse gas regulation program is now firmly established - for the moment anyway.  The D.C. Circuit today rejected every challenge by numerous petitioners and intervenors to the whole raft of USEPA rules that followed from the critical Supreme Court decision, Massachusetts v. EPA, in 2007.  In Coalition for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency (attached), the D.C. Circuit considered arguments against the validity of The Endangerment Rule, Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(s) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009), The Tailpipe Rule, Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010) The Tailoring Rule, Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31, 514 (June 3, 2010), and The Timing Rule, Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations That Determine Pollutants Covered by Clean Air Act Permitting Programs, 75 Fed. Reg. 17,004 (Apr. 2, 2010),  as well as a general challenge to the USEPA's implementation of the Clean Air Act.  Each argument was rejected.  The Endangerment and Tailpipe Rules are not arbitrary and capricious, no petitioner (whether from industry or a state) had standing to attack the Timing and Tailoring Rules, and the USEPA's interpretation of the relevant Clean Air Act provisions "is unambiguously correct." The blogosphere is overwhelmed with commentary and analysis.  Rather than repeat what others have already said, we want to focus on just one small segment (pages 45-50) of the 82 page opinion:  standing for the National Association of Home Builders (NAHB) and the National Oilseed Processors Association (NOPA).  The court singled out the NAHB and the NOPA because they were the only industry petitioners that had standing to challenge the "result of the Tailpipe Rule, which had the effect of expanding the [Prevention of Significant Deterioration] PSD program to never-regulated sources."  A little background is in order.  Massachusetts v. EPA established that greenhouse gases could be regulated as air pollutants (within the meaning of the Clean Air Act) by USEPA.  The Endangerment Finding concluded that six "well-mixed" greenhouse gases emitted from motor vehicles contributed to the "climate change problem" and thus were "reasonably anticipated to endanger public health and welfare."  As a result, USEPA issued the Tailpipe Rule, which set GHG emission standards for cars and light trucks. Two sections of the Clean Air Act, the PSD program and the state permitting requirements under Title V, are triggered by the emission of "any air pollutant" (which USEPA has interpreted to mean: any regulated air pollutant).  Accordingly, once GHGs were regulated anywhere under the Clean Air Act (such as from tailpipes of motor vehicles), GHGs constituted an "air pollutant" within the meaning of the Act and stationary sources that emitted GHGs became subject to PSD and Title V permitting requirements.  The proverbial camel's nose was in the tent, and the camel followed post-haste. This approach to regulation was long-standing and had been relevant to rules promulgated in 1978, 1980 and 2002.  Since the Act provided for a basis for review only within 60 days of the promulgation of national regulations, challenges to USEPA's approach were very much time-barred, but with one very significant exception: "if such petition is based solely on grounds arising after such sixtieth day, ..." 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1). What this means is that an entity whose claim has recently ripened has standing to challenge the USEPA's approach.  Stated differently, entities that did not have standing in 1978, 1980 or 2002 because "their alleged injuries were only speculative" (such as NAHB and NOPA), may subsequently find they do have standing because their facilities are now regulated.  NOPA asserted that "[prior] to promulgation of the Tailpipe Rule, no member's facility had triggered PSD review by virtue of emissions of a non-criteria pollutant.  Now that greenhouse gases are a regulated non-criteria pollutant, many NOPA members will have to obtain PSD permits as [a] result of their facilities' emissions ..."  NAHB members who likewise were not subject to PSD requirements, were now certain to have to obtain PSD permits sometime in the future.  Accordingly, unlike other industry petitioners, NOPA and NAHB were found to have standing to challenge USEPA's "interpretation of the PSD permitting triggers ..."  This result is important.  Absent regulations like the Tailoring Rule, GHG regulation will be far-reaching and will bring in entities not previously subject to regulation.  Those entities will be entitled to challenge the regulation, as well as the methods USEPA uses to implement the regulations, even if those methods have been around for decades.  Thus, even though USEPA's GHG program sailed through this set of challenges, the door certainly is not closed to other challenges as GHG regulation expands.    20120626 Coalition for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v EPA (D.C. Cir.).pdf (188.21 kb)

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