All posts tagged 'Modeling'

Storm Surge in Your Lobby: You Should Have Been Thinking About Hurricane Isaac Months Ago

August 28, 2012 07:43
by J. Wylie Donald
12 feet.  Water that deep comfortably inundates the front office's front door and floats the boss's desk.  And that is the predicted maximum storm surge for coastal Louisiana and Mississippi as Hurricane Isaac bears down.   So there are likely to be a few problems in that part of the country by the time the sun goes down this afternoon.  What can be done?  At this late hour, very little unfortunately, other than heading for the hills; here the adage “an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure” says it all. Other than sand bags and plywood sheeting what preventive steps have some taken?  We’d like to focus on some things lawyers and businesspeople can address ahead of time:  modeling, insurance and contracting. Modeling – Besides wreaking record havoc, Hurricane Andrew in 1992 was the coming of age for catastrophe modelers. As reported by Business Insurance last week, when AIR Worldwide reported an estimated $13 billion in damage to its clients following the storm's passage, reaction ranged from “skepticism to outrage.”   Now modeling is big business and well accepted.  Indeed, modeling was approved by the Maryland Court of Appeals as an appropriate way to make business decisions in January of this year.  See People's Insurance Counsel Division v. Allstate Insurance Co., 36 A.3d 464 (Md. 2012). There is no reason to believe that Maryland’s lead would not be followed elsewhere. Today the public can get the benefit of some of the modelers’ insight in email alerts from companies’ such as AIR, or simply downloading them from the internet.  Those following Hurricane Isaac were able to learn that its ultimate effect was unsettled:  Isaac reaching hurricane status tonight leaves 24 hours of time for additional development prior to landfall; within that window, Isaac could reach Category 2 intensity. How much stronger Isaac will become will depend in part on the storm's track—that is, how much time it will spend over the warm waters of the Gulf of Mexico.  Further adding to the uncertainty around Isaac’s forecast intensity is the fact that the storm will be moving over some of the warmest waters it has encountered to date, so a period of rapid intensification that leads to even stronger winds cannot be ruled out. Subscribers to services offered by modeling firms can assess their exposures long before a hurricane makes landfall and take steps to diversify or minimize risks, can optimize their response to a looming hurricane by shifting production or scheduling a shutdown, and can make time-critical decisions as the catastrophe unfolds with the best data available concerning not only the storm’s effect on one’s own facility, but on the infrastructure and other plants on which one’s facility depends. Including such modeling in business planning leads to improvement of the bottom line. Insurance – It is well-documented that insurers don’t particularly care for flood risk, including storm surge.  Following Hurricane Katrina dozens of cases sought insurance coverage for storm surge. The courts were not sympathetic; most found flood exclusions and anti-concurrent causation clauses valid and applicable. For example, where homeowners did not purchase flood insurance through the National Flood Insurance Program after being told by their carrier “Your policy does not cover flood loss. You can get protection through the National Flood Insurance Program,” the Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s ruling and stated, among other things, “The omission of the specific term "storm surge" does not create ambiguity in the policy regarding coverage available in a hurricane and does not entitle the Leonards to recovery for their flood-induced damages.”  Leonard v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 499 F.3d 419, 438 (5th Cir. 2007).  Commercial insureds fared no better.  E.g., Northrop Grumman Corp. v. Factory Mut. Ins. Co., 538 F.3d 1090, modified, 563 F.3d 777 (9th Cir. 2008). All of which is not to say that flood coverage is not available, but one has to actively seek it out, and pay for it.  This has important implications for supply chain coverage because if one's policy does not cover flood, and one's key supplier (scheduled under the contingent business interruption coverage) is shut down (as happened to many last year with Thailand's epic flooding), then there will be no coverage.  In other words, flood risk must be assessed at all relevant locations, not simply the insured's locations.  Contracting away risk – Considering storm surge, one researcher has written:  "In many places, only inches separate the once-a-decade flood from the once-a-century one; and separate the water level communities have prepared for, from the one no one has seen.  Critically, a small change can make a big difference, like the last inch of water that overflows a tub."  Ben Strauss et al., Surging Seas 4 (Mar. 14, 2012).  We saw just above that insurance may not be available for a storm surge.  Is there any other path to recovery?  Some that have purchased properties that have subsequently suffered flood damage have pursued their transaction professionals for the loss based on the theory that there should have been some disclosure.  They have had some success.  See, e.g., Perri v. Prestigious Homes, Inc., Docket No. A-0403-10T1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 13, 2012) (suing broker for flood damage); Stonacek v. City of Lincoln, 782 N.W.2d 900 (Neb. 2010) (suing realtor, developer, engineer and city for ensuing water damage from flood); Loya v. Howard Hanna Smythe Cramer Co., 2009 Ohio 448 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009) (suing realtor for ensuing water damage from flood); Potter v. First Real Estate Co., 844 So. 2d 540 (Ala. 2002) (suing realtor based on flooding); Clay v. Walden Joint Venture, 611 So. 2d 254 (Ala. 1992) (referring to suit against realtor for flood damage).  It is relatively easy, however, to inoculate oneself against that kind of suit:  make the disclosure in the contract.  Realtors and sellers in Norfolk, Virginia apparently already do that. For a more detailed discussion see J. Wylie Donald, Getting Ahead of Storm Surge, Especially in an Era of Climate Change. Sand bags and plywood sheeting are irreplaceable as a hurricane roars in.  Maybe one should start including other preventive steps as equally necessary in order to avoid the proverbial several pounds of cure.

Flood Insurance | Insurance | Rising Sea Levels | Weather

The Maryland Court of Appeals Looks at Models and Likes What it Sees - People's Insurance Counsel Division v. Allstate Insurance Co.: Affirmed

January 28, 2012 21:59
by J. Wylie Donald
Notwithstanding that millions tune in to the long-running reality TV show America's Next Top Model, the real modeling action is not in Hollywood.  Instead, it is on computer mainframes churning out annual simulations of 100,000 years or more of catastrophes such as hurricanes, earthquakes and terrorist attacks. Such analysis drew the attention of the Maryland Court of Appeals in its seminal opinion last Wednesday in People's Insurance Counsel Division v. Allstate Insurance Co. (attached), which affirmed the appropriateness of modeling in an insurer's decision to issue, or not, homeowners' insurance policies. The facts in Allstate were relatively simple. In 2006 Allstate determined that it would no longer write homeowners' policies on Maryland properties within one mile of the Atlantic Ocean. It subsequently extended that decision to completely exclude from new policies five Maryland counties, and portions of an additional six counties (all identified by zip code). It relied on a model developed by Applied Insurance Research, Inc. (AIR), which showed that the hurricane losses Allstate would suffer in the identified zip code areas were too high. Dutifully Allstate filed the appropriate papers with the Maryland Insurance Administration. The Administration found nothing exceptional about the application. The People's Insurance Counsel Division (PICD) (a part of the Office of the Attorney General) did, however, and requested a hearing.  It lost before the Commissioner of Insurance, then before the Circuit Court and again before the Court of Special Appeals (see our post).   PICD then appealed to Maryland's highest court and argued before the Court of Appeals that Allstate had failed to meet its burden of showing that its decision was not "arbitrary, capricious or unfairly discriminatory."  See Md. Ins. Code § 27-501(a)(1).   Following from that, PICD further argued that the designation of areas by zip code did not have an objective basis and therefore was arbitrary and unreasonable. See Md. Ins. Code § 19-107(a).  Allstate's proofs consisted primarily of computer modeling evidence, which the Commissioner found sufficient. Much of the opinion is directed to the parsing of Maryland's Insurance Code and its legislative history to determine whether § 27-501 even applied (the Court of Special Appeals had found it did not, and the Court of Appeals reversed that portion of the decision). We leave it to the insurance blogosphere to address that further. What is of interest to this readership is how modeling came into the decision and where modeling stands as a result. In the proceeding Allstate offered a model that simulates hurricanes from genesis to decay and the damages that would be suffered.  Basically, AIR modelers "developed mathematical functions that describe the interaction between buildings and their contents and the local intensity to which they are exposed." PICD at 7.  Allstate established with expert evidence that catastrophe risk is not diversified ("adding additional catastrophe risk does not reduce overall risk because of pooling but actually increases the overall risk") and that historical loss data is incomplete and outdated "making it difficult to estimate losses."  PICD at 7.  Accordingly, "it has become standard practice for insurance companies to use catastrophe models to anticipate the likelihood and severity of potential future catastrophes before they occur." PICD at 5-6. The advantages of modeling are substantial;  (1) It was able to capture the effects on catastrophic loss distribution of changes over time in population patterns, building codes, amounts insured, and construction costs;(2) It provides a complete picture of the probable distribution of losses rather than just estimates of probable maximum losses; (3) Because simulation models can be tested more easily than other approaches, it leads to greater stability in estimating expected annual losses;(4) It provides a means to determine the impact of new scientific information; and(5) It provides a framework for performing sensitivity analyses and “what if” studies. PICD at 6 As the Court noted, "By using computer models, they can get 100,000 years of simulated loss experience, which is good not just for State-wide pricing but also for loss characteristics related to hurricanes down to the ZIP Code level." PICD at 7.  PICD retained an actuary to rebut Allstate's proofs; he testified with respect to "actuarial science." He was hampered, perhaps fatally, when the Commissioner refused to allow him "to express any opinion with respect to the model that formed the basis of Allstate's amended filing." PICD at 11. We were not there but the Court of Appeals paints a picture of a non-committal expert. He offered that the decision to not write new policies was unreasonable "'because there is no showing that it is reasonable.'" And he "declined to choose" the method Allstate should have chosen to reduce its risk.  PICD at 11. In a post-hearing submission PICD argued that "Allstate was required to produce valid statistical data demonstrating the probability of a hurricane sufficiently strong to cause catastrophic damage actually making landfall in Maryland and that it failed to do so."  PICD at 23.  The statistical standard was based on dicta in an earlier Court of Special Appeals decision, Crumlish v Ins. Comm'r, 520 A.2d 738 (1987), which the Commisioner and the Court distinguished.  First, Crumlish's requirement for statistical evidence was not a universal requirement. PICD at 25. More significant was the "catchall" exception added to § 27-501 which established a "standard approved by the Commissioner that is based on factors that adversely affect the losses or expenses of the insurer under its approved rating plan and for which statistical validation is unavailable or is unduly burdensome." PICD at 25. "That is what the Commissioner did in this case."  PICD at 25.  In other words, the Commissioner found Allstate's evidence met its burden of demonstrating that its use of modeling as the basis to stop writing policies in certain areas was reasonably related to its business and economic purposes and was not discriminatory.  The dissent would have adopted the Crumlish dicta and required Allstate to offer statistical evidence concerning the landfall of destructive hurricanes in Maryland. PICD, dissent at 5.  Such an assessment was either to be based on the historical record (an impossibility as no hurricane had ever made landfall in Maryland) or "climate science" (which one would think would include modeling).  PICD, dissent at 9, 10.  According to the dissent, all Allstate provided was a computation of the "relative risk" of a hurricane landfall in Maryland as once in 25,000 years based on the worst 5% of hurricanes that made landfall in North Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware.  Allstate justified its decision based on hypothetical hurricanes, i.e., a model.  PICD, dissent at 7. The Court properly rejected this distinction.  The use of probabilistic catastrophe risk modeling came of age following the destruction caused by Hurricane Andrew in South Florida in 1992. As stated by modeler RMS in its 2008 A Guide to Catastrophe Modeling (p6):  "It became clear that a probabilistic approach to loss analysis was the most appropriate way to manage catastrophe risk. Hurricane Andrew illustrated that the actuarial approach to managing catastrophe risk was insufficient; a more sophisticated modeling approach was needed."  Another modeling firm, EQECat, put it this way:  "The main concern for all users is the uncertainties in the models. Some time ago, the only way to estimate a probable loss was to trust few statistical studies of past losses from some historical events and or on the experience of the underwriter. The uncertainty in these models was quite large as confirmed once a new event [such as Hurricane Andrew] took place. The main problem is that there is not enough historical data, and the standard actuarial techniques of loss estimation are inappropriate for catastrophe losses."  One of the purposes of catastrophe modeling is to assist the user (often an insurer) in avoiding the alliteratively named "risk of ruin."  If all the industry is using a tool that can minimize the risk of run, it would ill-behoove a court to take away that tool.  In Allstate the Maryland Court of Appeals agreed.  Nevertheless, if one is looking for guidance on how modeling will be received in the courts, there is one significant question left unresolved by this decision:  how will competing models be treated?  PCID's expert seems to have been completely out of his league. Whatever his actuarial credentials, if the issue is modeling then a modeling expert is needed. And at the very least the AIR model was subject to challenge. In a review published just this month, Assessing US Hurricane Risk: Do the Models Make Sense?, AIR takes on its competition, RMS, and states:  "with this latest round of updates, we [modelers] find ourselves more divergent in our views of risk than ever." (p5)  As one example of this divergence, "Catastrophe modeling companies have vastly different views on what influence sea surface temperatures (SSTs) in the Atlantic Ocean have on U.S. hurricane landfall risk." (p12).  If AIR is correct, perhaps application of the RMS model would have altered the list of excluded zip codes. More fundamentally, does the uncertainty established by competing models (and that is inherent in modeling) impose an unavoidable and unacceptable arbitrariness in application?  That is for another day.  For the moment, modeling companies and those who use them likely will proceed full speed ahead. Post scriptum - Climate change seems to have been a subject not to be discussed.  As noted by the dissent, if Allstate was worried about the science of climate change, it didn't bring it up.  Nevertheless, the dissent did bring it up and asserted that meteorological change occasioned by climate change could be a legitimate basis for Allstate's decision.  The modeling firms think otherwise. Eqecat's CEO Bill Keogh has stated because of the uncertainty associated with climate change's effect on hurricanes, " it has no role in catastrophe risk modeling." Peoples Insurance Counsel Division v Allstate Insurance Company.pdf (78.07 kb)

Climate Change | Climate Change Effects | Insurance | Regulation

Ceres and a Series of Serious Thoughts About the NAIC Climate Disclosures - Part II

September 16, 2011 05:09
by J. Wylie Donald
We wrote yesterday to introduce Ceres’ report on the disclosure of climate risks by insurers and considered its first Recommendation to Regulators concerning mandatory and public disclosures.  We address today the second recommendation in Climate Risk Disclosures by Insurers:  Evaluating Insurer Responses to the NAIC Climate Disclosure Survey.    Ceres’ second recommendation is to "[c]reate shared resources around the implications of climate trends on enterprise risk management."  Id. at 51.  In other words, more research should be made available concerning investment risks and opportunities, correlated risks, loss modeling, the potential for loss of health and life, and customer resilience (ability to resist extreme events).  Id.  Taking modeling by way of example, Ceres discusses modeling thoroughly in Part 2 and the discussion is thought-provoking.  Several insurers are conducting climate change modeling internally.  For the rest, they rely on third-party vendors, which invokes much criticism from Ceres.  "The majority of insurers that report using catastrophe models describe them in terms that suggest their company does not have a clear understanding of how the models can or cannot be used to anticipate changing risk.  Most of the industry relies on third-party catastrophe risk models that only marginally integrate changing extreme weather."  Id. at 6.  "[I]nsurers relying entirely on third-party models may be severely unequipped to adjust pricing to incorporate emerging climate risks." Id. at 31.  "Insurers' disclosures suggest that the majority of insurers may be setting pricing based on flawed assumptions of how the industry's loss models incorporate changing climate trends."  Id. at 32. Ceres lauds those companies that can do it in-house.  But specialization and economies of scale are fundamental drivers of the market.  Were every insurer to bring modeling inside, undoubtedly there would be some new insights not presently uncovered.  But there would also be insurers who got the models grievously wrong and, in most cases, the resources spent on modeling would be more cost-effectively spent on other items necessary to delivering products or services. To be sure, reliance on EQECAT, AIR Worldwide and RMS as the sources for all climate change modeling has its flaws.  One need only think back a few years to where another triumvirate dispensing financial ratings (allegedly) misled sophisticated investors around the globe.  But in a world of constrained resources, or even an unconstrained one, third-party modelers are necessary and beneficial.  Further, a disadvantage to society from in-house modeling is that the insights developed from proprietary work may remain just that:  proprietary.  Ceres acknowledges "it is ... possible that asymmetrical information can be used by individual companies to secure a competitive edge against their peers."  Id. at 38.  Indeed, "larger insurers more readily recognize the inherent limitations of current catastrophe models in light of changing climate than do their smaller competitors or clients.  These players have a clear competitive advantage in deploying resources to build the latest climate science into their pricing models."  Id. at 37.  Third-party vendors, on the other hand, spread their best products across many insurers, in effect sharing their best research (but only to those willing to pay for it).  We wrote yesterday of the need to recognize that intellectual capital is a business asset and criticizing a goal of making climate change disclosures public available.  We think those comments apply likewise to the sharing of resources. Nevertheless, Ceres does great work in raising the bar for third-party vendors.  By pointing out to insurer-users that they may not be getting what they really need from the modeling firms, we expect the modelers will have to go out and address Ceres’ criticisms.  For example, insurers are exposed if (as Ceres asserts) "few insured perils are modeled by insurers, leaving the possibility for climate-affected perils to be underpriced."  Id. at 35.  More specifically, "recent years have demonstrated that climate change may be driving up aggregated losses from smaller events, including perils such as floods, snowstorms and hailstorms, in ways that erode insurer profitability."  Id. Tomorrow we conclude our review with a look at Ceres’ third recommendation as well as sharing some concerns about research.

Climate Change | Insurance | Regulation

Hurricane Modeling Supports the Decision Not to Insure Hurricane Risks Rules the Maryland Court of Special Appeals

March 31, 2011 20:32
by J. Wylie Donald
"Catastrophic risk is different." So concludes an important opinion out of the Maryland Court of Special Appeals filed earlier this month.  In the case of first impression, People's Insurance Counsel Division v. Allstate Insurance Company, the court affirmed the primacy of models and business judgment in the writing of insurance, and further recognized that there is a "gaping difference between ordinary insurance risk and catastrophe risk." The case stems from the decision way back in 2006 by Allstate to advise the Maryland Insurance Administration (MIA) that it did not intend to write any new property policies in certain Maryland counties subject to heightened hurricane risk. As distilled by the court: "certain coastal areas bordering the Atlantic Ocean and the Chesapeake Bay presented an unusually high risk of loss in the event of a catastrophic hurricane. As a result, [Allstate] decided that it was no longer in Allstate's best economic interest to continue to write new property insurance policies in those areas." The MIA concluded that Allstate' business decision was properly made on "an obective basis and [was] neither arbitrary nor unreasonable." However, the state's public advocate, in the guise of the People's Insurance Counsel Division, concluded differently. Following a trip to Maryland's highest court, which confirmed the Division had standing to challenge the MIA's decision, the Division argued that Allstate's determination not to write property policies in certain geographic areas was arbitrary and unreasonable in contravention of Maryland Insurance Article § 19-107. Further, the Division argued that because Allstate had not shown that a hurricane would strike Maryland and that its rates were insufficient to carry that loss, the decision violated § 27-501. Section 19-107 To determine whether it wanted to undertake the risk of hurricanes along the Eastern Seaboard, Allstate retained Applied Insurance Research (AIR) to model the areas of the state and region that were catastrophe-prone, and those that were not.  It concluded that some or all of certain Maryland counties were at a substantially heightened risk of higher levels of hurricane damage than other areas. The model was explained:  "What it did, in order to get down to the zip codes, statistical level, generated the next year 100,000 times. That is, it's doing simulations of the next year, 100,000 times. And what they do in order to do that is they look at the last 100 years of meteorological data to try to come up with a probability of various hurricane strikes." In those 100,000 simulations AIR concluded that there would be eight hurricane strikes that would cause half a billion dollars in damage in Maryland alone. Because Allstate insured a substantial number of properties in these risky areas, it made the "business judgment that further growth at this time could jeopardize [its] anticipated long-term strength." The court quoted the Commissioner in holding that Allstate complied with the law:  "I conclude that Allstate's geographic designation of Hurricane Bands 4-6 had adequate factual support and, therefore, was not arbitrary or unreasonable. Allstate's hurricane bands were developed based on objective and reasonable factors, including modeled hurricane loss data, proximity to water and geographic contiguity. Through its use of the hurricane models, Allstate developed [Average Damage Ratios] ADRs at a zip code level. The higher the ADR, the higher the potential damage the area in the band is likely to sustain in the event of a catastrophic storm." Section 27-501 This section of the Insurance Article forbids an insurer from refusing a "particular insurance risk or class of risk" for "any arbitrary, capricious or unfairly discriminatory reason." The court first held that a decision to stop doing business did not address a particular individual or group of individuals; therefore, because Allstate's decision was "broad-based", section 27-501 simply did not apply. But even if it did, the modeling demonstrated that the decision was not unfairly discriminatory, arbitrary or capricious. The Division asserted that ""Allstate was legally required to show the probability of a catastrophic hurricane striking Maryland in order to justify its no-write decision."  The court was dismissive and characterized the Division's contention as "unreal". The issue faced by Allstate was very plain, syllogistic in fact:  THE ENTIRE EASTERN SEABOARD OF THE UNITED STATES IS AT RISK FROM HURRICANES.MARYLAND IS PART OF THE EASTERN SEABOARD OF THE UNITED STATES.THEREFORE, MARYLAND IS AT RISK FROM HURRICANES (capitals in original).  The court then went on to enumerate the details that the model considered such as historical hurricane reports, weather databases, and property values.  It came down firmly on the value of the model:  "Allstate's use of the AIR Hurricane Model V7.0 cranked out, zip code by zip code, predictive statistical data for 100,000 model years.  We are hard-pressed to understand exactly what more the Division could want." As to the Division's last argument (that prior Court of Special Appeals precedent required Allstate to demonstrate that its rate plan was insufficient to cover catastrophe losses) the court was scathing. Referring to the Division's argument as "fantasy analysis," it demonstrated that the precedent on which the Division relied suffered from a fundamental error in its understanding of the source materials and, as it "was wrong in 1987, ..., as it most assuredly was, it is still wrong 24 years later." The court concluded its analysis with a discussion of catastrophe risk.  It pointed out that for the usual risk, say fire or car accidents, insurers diversify their risk by taking on more insureds.  Where a catastrophic risk is present, however, taking on more insureds increases the risk to the insurer, rather than decreases the risk, because if the catastrophe strikes, all of the insureds will make a claim.  It concluded that catastrophic risk was "unique" and that case law that focused on individual insureds was completely irrelevant. People's Insurance Counsel is significant at a number of levels for those following climate change insurance issues.  First, the modeling data and results were unchallenged.  There are three dominant modeling companies (AIR, EqeCat and Risk Management Solutions) so the Division was not stymied here because Allstate's modeler had a lock on the market. More likely, it was recognized that while a different model might preserve coverage for a few zip codes, the models would not reach fundamentally different outcomes.  If the goal was to ensure that Allstate (and by extension all other insurance companies) could not abandon the front lines of hurricane risk, no model would show that Worcester County (on the ocean) would have a similar risk as Garrett County (at the headwaters of the Potomac). Businesses should take note.  In most businesses, profit is made at the margins.  Employing models to ascertain where the weather-related risks change their character could yield real monetary benefit - as Allstate demonstrated by giving up underwriting in only parts of some counties.   Second, AIR looked at historical weather records. It made no predictions about the future more severe weather called for in climate change models. This reluctance to face the future is not unique to insurance companies.  The Federal Emergency Management Agency takes the same approach in its analysis of flood plains.  We have written elsewhere concerning the head-in-the-sand mentality that afflicts many that are subject to altered climate change risks.  Catastrophe modeling is no different.  We await the case that tests the insurer's ability to rely not on what has happened in the past, but on what is predicted for the future. Third, there is (at the moment anyway) a great belief in the efficiency of the market in identifying the appropriate path for society.  The insurance markets are taking steps to halt the migration to the shore by determining not to insure it.  It remains to be seen whether governments will abide by those business decisions or force dislocations onto the market in order to preserve continued growth in hurricane-prone areas.  Maryland, for the moment, appears to be one state that is allowing the insurance market to shape the future of the shore.  As we have blogged before, other states (notably Florida), are not so laissez-faire.

Insurance | Regulation | Weather

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